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Abstract 
 
I argue that embodied understanding and conceptual-representational 
understanding interact through schematic structure. I demonstrate that 
common conceptions of these two kinds of understanding, such as developed 
by Wheeler (2005, 2008) and Dreyfus (2007a, b, 2013), entail a separation 
between them that gives rise to significant problems. Notably, it becomes 
unclear how they could interact; a problem that has been pointed out by 
Dreyfus (2007a, b, 2013) and McDowell (2007) in particular. I propose a 
Kantian strategy to close the gap between them. I argue that embodied and 
conceptual-representational understanding are governed by schemata. Since 
they are governed by schemata, they can interact through a structure that 
they have in common. Finally, I spell out two different ways to conceive of the 
schematic interaction between them—a close, grounding relationship and a 
looser relationship that allows for a minimal interaction, but preserves the 
autonomy of both forms of understanding. 
 
Keywords: Embodied Understanding, Conceptual-Representational 
Understanding, Embodied Cognition, Kant, Heidegger, Schemata 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Proponents of Embodied Cognition as well as 
contemporary Phenomenologists usually separate between 
embodied understanding on the one hand and conceptual-
representational understanding on the other hand (Wheeler 
2005; Dreyfus 2007a, b, 2013; Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 
2013). Whereas embodied understanding is supposed to 
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constitute what we can call a practically-engaged mode of 
dealing with the world, conceptual-representational 
understanding is supposed to constitute what we can call a 
theoretically-detached mode of thinking (§2).1 
The separation between these kinds of understanding is 
strict. This is apparent from how embodied and conceptual-
representational understanding are characterized. Whereas 
embodied understanding is supposed to be governed by 
embodied and sensorimotor abilities, conceptual-
representational understanding is linguistic or symbolic. 
Embodied understanding is context-sensitive, action-oriented 
and pragmatic; conceptual-representational understanding is 
general, abstract and disembodied. Accordingly, it seems as if 
the separation renders these kinds of understanding as 
autonomous and structurally unrelated to each other (§2.1).  
I argue in §2.2 that we receive a segmented conception of 
the mind, in which two autonomous kinds of understanding 
pull the embodied agent into different directions, if we cannot 
account for the relationship between these two kinds of 
understanding. Given such a segmented conception of the mind, 
it is unclear how conceptual thought can relate to embodied 
understanding, as is the case when we report an action or make 
a judgment about a perceived situation (Dreyfus 2007a, b; 
McDowell 2007). Similarly, if conceptual-representational 
understanding is not structurally connected to embodied 
understanding, which is the ground of concernful interactions 
with the world, it is mysterious how conceptual-
representational understanding exhibits practical meaning and 
significance (Heidegger 1962; Dreyfus 1991). Even though the 
problem of a segmented mind has been addressed by Dreyfus 
(2007a, b) and McDowell (1994, 2007), we are left without a 
sufficient account to overcome it. Dreyfus (2007a) admits that 
he has no explanation of the relationship between these two 
kinds of understanding (§2.1), and McDowell’s (1994, 2007) 
account is unacceptably intellectualist (§3.1). 
In §3 I propose the following positive solution to 
overcome the separation. Like McDowell, I draw on Kant to do 
so. Yet, unlike McDowell, I refer to Kant’s thoughts on 
spatiotemporal schemata. For Kant, the basic structure of 
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experience is that of spatiality and temporality. Kant connects 
conceptual thought with experience, by arguing that concepts 
are governed by schemata that determine the possible spatial 
and temporal forms that objects of experience can have. For 
instance, the schema of the concept of dog determines all 
possible forms that dogs can have in space and time and 
thereby allows the concept to be about the experience of things 
in space and time. Conceptual thought and experience are able 
to interact, since both exhibit a common structure: spatiality 
and temporality (§3.1).  
I argue in §3.2 that spatiotemporal schemata govern 
both—embodied and conceptual-representational 
understanding. Schemata can be conceived of as ontologically 
and cognitively modest. They are ontologically modest, because 
most objects of the understanding can be minimally 
characterized by their spatial and temporal properties. They 
are cognitively modest, because understanding has to be 
minimally responsive to the spatial and temporal structure of 
the world surrounding us; i.e. the spatiotemporal world that 
contains objects and situations about which embodied and 
conceptual-representational understanding are. 
If both kinds of understanding exhibit at a basic level 
spatiotemporally schematic structure, this schematic ground 
allows for a structural connection between both of them. In §4 I 
describe two ways to conceive of this structural connection. We 
can conceive of it, first, as a grounding relationship, where 
embodied understanding grounds conceptual-representational 
understanding (§4.1). Or we can conceive of it, second, as a 
looser relationship, where schemata allow for “cross-talk” 
between the two kinds of understanding, yet where the 
autonomy of each is preserved to a certain degree (§4.2). 
 
2. The separation between embodied and 
conceptual-representational understanding 
In contemporary philosophy, a distinction is frequently 
made between two kinds of understanding—embodied 
understanding and conceptual-representational understanding. 
These two kinds of understanding are supposed to roughly 
correspond to two ways of engaging with the world that we can 
Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 
 
 
633 
 
call ‘practically-engaged’ and ‘theoretically-detached’. In the 
following I discuss how these distinctions are drawn, what 
motivates them and which problems they entail.  
Let us first focus on the phenomenologically inspired 
work of Michael Wheeler (2005, 2008) and Hubert Dreyfus 
(2007a, 2007b, 2013). Both differentiate between different 
modes of engagement based on phenomenological analyses that 
are inspired by Martin Heidegger’s (1962) and Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) work. The first mode of engagement 
that Dreyfus and Wheeler identify is reflective of our 
experience of most of our interactions with the world. They call 
it in accord with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty ‘readiness-to-
hand’ or ‘smooth coping’ respectively. It is characterized by 
environmentally immersed, non-reflective and contextual action.  
This mode of engagement exhibits no experienced 
distinction between subject and object and is structured by the 
body. As Wheeler states:  
(…) smooth coping in the domain of the ready-to-hand has a non-
representational phenomenology. Smooth coping involves a form of 
awareness in which there are no subjects and no objects, only the 
experience of the ongoing task (e.g. typing). (Wheeler 2008, 338) 
For instance, if I hammer a nail, I am engaging in a 
skillful activity in which my awareness of myself is lost in the 
activity. I am often not only not aware of myself in these 
engagements, I am also not aware of operating on determinate 
objects with decontextualized properties. To the contrary, I 
focus on the activity that is directed towards the end result of my 
action and the work that is to be achieved. As Heidegger states:  
That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the 
tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with 
which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to 
be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. 
(Heidegger 1962, 99) 
In this mode of engagement, readiness-to-hand, things show up 
to me only as things-for-the-sake-of-the-work that I seek to 
achieve. In our case, hammer and nail show up contextually as 
things with which I, for instance, hang up a picture.  
Dreyfus and Wheeler distinguish this mode of 
engagement, from deliberative, reflective, decontextualized and 
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detached modes of engagement. We are involved in these 
detached modes of engagement, for instance, when we 
encounter practical problems, reason or do science. Both 
authors identify these modes of engagement with what 
Heidegger (1962) called ‘un-readiness-to-hand’ and ‘presence-at-
hand’. In the former, we are disturbed in our smooth coping and 
search for solutions to the problems that caused the 
disturbance. In the latter, we take an observer stance towards 
the world and conceive of it in terms of objects with 
decontextualized properties.  
In both of these cases, a ‘cognitive distance’ is introduced 
between subject and object which is not present in skillful coping 
(Wheeler 2008, 383). This introduction of an experiential 
distinction between object and subject seems to entail for 
Dreyfus and Wheeler that we conceive of objects in detached 
modes of engagement in a literally ‘objective’ way. As Wheeler 
states:  
When revealed as present-at-hand (e.g. by detached theoretical 
reflection) an entity will be experienced in terms of properties that 
are action-neutral, specifiable without essential reference to the 
representing agent, and context-independent. Moreover, according to 
Heidegger, this group of properties will also characterize the contents 
of the agent’s related representational states. (Wheeler 2008, 339, 
emphasis added)  
Wheeler and Dreyfus argue that readiness-to-hand is 
governed by embodied understanding and that un-readiness-to-
hand and presence-at-hand are governed by (action-oriented or 
classical) representations (Wheeler) or linguistic concepts 
(Dreyfus), which exhibit the characteristics of ‘conceptual 
content, mindedness, and rationality’ (Dreyfus 2013, 29). The 
assumption here is that embodied understanding enables 
engaged-practical modes of engagement with the world and 
that conceptual-representational understanding enables 
theoretical-detached modes of engagement with the world, in 
particular, decontextualized, body-neutral conceptual content.  
We find similar claims about different modes of 
engagement and corresponding differences in the underlying 
kinds of understanding in other embodied conceptions of 
understanding. For instance, various authors argue for the 
Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 
 
 
635 
 
existence of something like a pre-conceptual background that 
characterizes most of our engagements with the world. This 
background is conceived of as a holistic and contextual 
background structure that allows us to act and interact with 
our living world. This pre-conceptual background is then 
contrasted with explicit concept use (Dreyfus 2007a, 2007b, 
Wheeler 2008; Hutto 2012; Dreyfus and Taylor 2015).  
Another similar separation is made in Radical Embodied 
Cognitive Science and closely related versions of Enactivism 
(Chemero 2009; Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015). One central 
concept of this project is ‘affordance’ which is defined by Chemero 
(2009) as a relation between agents and environments and, in 
accord with J.J. Gibson, as the embodied, pragmatic meaning of 
objects. In this sense, affordances grant an understanding of 
objects for engaged-practical purposes. The explanatory scope of 
affordances is yet unclear for Chemero (2009). In particular, he 
deems it an open question to what extent Radical Embodied 
Cognitive Science will be able to explain, what he calls in accord 
with Clark and Toribio (1994), ‘representation hungry tasks’.  
As we have seen above, many authors differentiate 
between different ways of relating to the world. On the one hand, 
we have a practical-engaged mode that pertains to action and 
perception. This practical-engaged mode is contextual, holistic, 
value-laden, body-centric and is governed by embodied 
understanding (Dreyfus 2007b; Wheeler 2008). On the other hand 
is a theoretical-detached mode, which is thought to include 
engaging in decontextualized, general propositional thought 
(Hurley 1998), distinctly cognitive intentionality (Kelly 2002), 
doing science, theorizing and using language (Wheeler 2005; 
Chemero 2009), engaging with the world in a detached, 
observational fashion (Dreyfus 2007b), deliberative, reflective 
rationality (Dreyfus 2013), judging, believing or planning (Hutto 
and Myin 2013), or participating in the space of reasons (Dreyfus 
and Taylor 2015). This detached-theoretical mode is supposedly 
governed by conceptual-representational understanding. 
 
2.1. The separation is strict 
Now we need to ask how strict the separation between 
embodied and conceptual-representational understanding is. Is 
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there continuity between the different kinds of understanding 
or are they radically separate from each other? The answers to 
this question differ. For instance, Hutto and Myin (2013) see no 
connection between the embodied abilities that generate action 
and perception, and contentful conceptual-representational 
understanding. Contrary to that, Dreyfus in particular has 
stressed the continuity between the two kinds of 
understanding. As Dreyfus claims:  
Intelligence is founded on and presupposes the more basic way of 
coping we share with animals. (Dreyfus 2007b, 250)  
Another expression of Dreyfus’s commitment to the continuity 
between both kinds of understanding is the following.  
Absorbed bodily coping, its motor intentional content, and the world’s 
interconnected solicitations to act provide the background on the 
basis of which it becomes possible for the mind with its conceptual 
content to think about and act upon a categorially unified world. 
(Dreyfus 2007a, 360–361) 
Importantly, Dreyfus deems conceptual-representational 
understanding constitutively dependent upon embodied 
understanding.  
Similar remarks have been made recently from a Neo-
Pragmatist perspective by Gallagher: 
Pragmatists and neo-pragmatists would treat the intentionality of 
propositional attitudes as derived from a more original form of 
embodied intentionality, what phenomenologists like Husserl and 
Merleau-Ponty call “motor intentionality.” (Gallagher 2014, 121) 
Further, in particular proponents of Embodied Cognition 
support the claim that cognition, action, and perception are 
integrated with each other (Thompson and Stapleton 2009) or 
that they are non-separable, interaction-dominant components 
of one dynamic system (Chemero 2014). If that is the case, i.e. if 
cognition, action, and perception are integrated and inseparable 
from each other, it should be entailed that both kinds of 
understanding are also integrated with each other and 
inseparable from each other, which again entails a strong form 
of continuity.  
And not surprisingly, a standard response by proponents 
of Embodied Cognition to the question about the relationship 
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between these kinds of understanding is that they are 
‘somehow’ connected and continuous with each other. But there 
is no concrete philosophical explanation of what the 
relationship between embodied and conceptual-representational 
understanding actually is.2  
We can see this at the example of Dreyfus’s (2007a) 
account. As we have seen above, Dreyfus claims, with recourse 
to Heidegger and in particular Merleau-Ponty, that motor 
intentionality and other embodied abilities enable conceptual-
representational understanding. Yet, Dreyfus does not provide 
an explanation of the relationship between the two kinds of 
understanding. He merely claims that they are connected with 
each other, without providing an analysis of how our theoretical-
detached engagements with the world characteristically exhibit 
signs of motor intentionality or embodiment.  
To the contrary, Dreyfus (2007a, 364) claims that we 
experience ‘context-free, self-sufficient substances with 
detachable properties’ when we engage with the world as 
theoretically-detached, which he (Dreyfus 2007a, 364) identifies 
with ‘McDowell’s world of facts, features and data’. However, it 
is not clear what it means that decontextualized, self-sufficient 
substances exhibit signs of embodiment or motor intentionality. 
Further, Dreyfus states in another passage that ‘motor 
intentional content’ cannot in any ‘”form”’ be ‘”suitable to 
constitute the contents of conceptual capacities”’ (Dreyfus 
2007a, 360), which seems to contradict the claims Dreyfus 
makes about how embodied understanding, in particular motor 
intentionality, is the basis of conceptual-representational 
understanding.3 And to further heighten the confusion, Dreyfus 
concludes that neither he nor Heidegger nor Merleau-Ponty 
would have been able to provide an account of the relationship 
between embodied and conceptual-representational 
understanding: ‘It seems that (…) the phenomenologists can’t 
account for what makes it possible for us to step back and 
observe [the world]’ (Dreyfus 2007a, 364, my brackets). 
Concretely, Dreyfus admits that he cannot account for the 
relationship between conceptual-representational 
understanding and embodied understanding. 
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2.2. Problems with the separation 
The lack of an account that explains the relationship 
between two kinds of understanding is deeply concerning. What 
is in particular concerning is that the two kinds of 
understanding, according to how they are standardly described, 
seem structurally disparate—so disparate even that they are 
seemingly autonomous from each other. If that were the case, it 
is deeply mysterious how they could interact. 
Yet, it is obvious that they do interact. For instance, as 
McDowell (2007) has repeatedly pointed out, we need to account 
for how our embodied experience can be the object of verbal 
reports and how it can inform conceptual judgments. And as 
Alva Noë (2004, 2012) has pointed out, our embodied 
understanding itself exhibits such cognitive complexity that it 
requires a close relationship to conceptual-representational 
understanding. 
Further, if these kinds of understanding were separate 
and autonomous from each other, then it would be puzzling how 
human thinking and action are so synchronized in everyday 
behavior. If the two kinds of understanding were separately 
operating in an embodied agent, it would seem as if she would 
have to be torn in different directions, by autonomously 
operating kinds of understanding. 
Even more, if embodied understanding is that what 
generates meaning and significance for an agent, as at least 
Phenomenologists and Phenomenologically-inspired 
philosophers argue (Heidegger 1962; Merleau-Ponty 2012; 
Thompson 2007; Ratcliffe 2008; Noë 2012), then we need to 
address the question how conceptual-representational 
understanding itself receives meaning, in particular if we do 
not want to accept classic Intellectualist conceptions of a 
disembodied intellect.4 Accordingly, we need to account for the 
relationship between embodied understanding and conceptual-
representational understanding.  
In what follows I seek to account for this relationship 
with the following strategy. First, I suggest that spatiotemporal 
schemata can function as the ground for an interaction between 
Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 
 
 
639 
 
these kinds of understanding. Second, I describe different ways 
to conceive of the relationship between the kinds of 
understanding, given that they are connected through 
schematic structure.  
 
3. Bridging the separation with schematic structure 
In the following I suggest that schemata are the means 
by which embodied understanding and conceptual-
representational understanding interact. A schema, as I will 
argue, is an ontologically and cognitively minimal structure 
that preserves a certain degree of autonomy for both kinds of 
understanding, yet, allows for their close interaction. The 
following considerations draw heavily on Immanuel Kant’s 
conception of schemata, developed in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. I will introduce the conception of a schema based on his 
work and show how we can make the basic idea work in 
different ways, without having to accept the wider ramifications 
of Kant’s epistemological and ontological project. In order to do 
so, I spell out two different ways in which schemata can connect 
embodied and conceptual-representational understanding. 
 
3.1. Kantian schemata 
Schemata are a central, though often overlooked aspect 
of Kantian philosophy (Sherover 1971; Heidegger 1990; Carman 
1999; Hanna 2005; van Mazijk 2016). They are the structures 
that explain, for Kant, how experience and conceptual thought 
are synthesized. In the following I will discuss schemata in the 
context of Kant’s considerations on the synthesis of experience 
and conceptual thought. 
As is well known, Kant insisted that concepts and 
experience have to interact in order to make sense of either of 
them. Yet it is less well known that Kant is not satisfied with 
claiming that concepts and experience interact or that they are 
synthesized. Kant is concerned with the conditions that make it 
possible that concepts and experience can interact; i.e. Kant 
does not merely describe the necessity of the interaction 
between them, but he seeks to explain it further. This means 
that Kant is concerned with the structure that is the ground for 
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the interaction between concepts and experience, and 
accordingly with the conditions that make it possible that 
concepts are about objects of experience. 
Kant argues that there has to be a common structural 
ground, a ‘homogenous’ ‘third thing’, that has to be definitive of 
concepts and experience so that they can interact.  
Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in 
homogeneity [in Gleichartigkeit stehen] with the category on the one 
hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the 
application of the former to the latter. (Kant 1998, A138 / B177, 
emphasis and translation in original) 
Kant’s point is that concepts and experience have to 
exhibit a structural commonality, so that they can interact; or 
differently put, so that each can non-arbitrarily match with 
each other. Kant identifies this matching structure, the ‘third 
thing’, with schemata.  
According to Kant, schemata can perform their function 
as the common ground of both experience and concepts by being 
‘a priori time-determinations’ (Kant 1998, A145 / B184). 
Whether Kant then actually conceives of them merely as ‘a 
priori time-determinations’, i.e. as exhibiting temporal 
structure, is doubtful. It seems as if schemata not only exhibit 
temporal structure, but also spatial structure, as we can see 
from his discussion of the concept of substance. 
The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., 
the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical time-
determination in general, which therefore endures while everything 
else changes. (Kant 1998, A144 / B183)  
What allows for the concept of substance and the 
experience of a substance to interact is that both—or rather 
schemata in the case of concepts—have spatial and temporal 
structure in common. For instance, the experience of a 
substance is that of an entity that is a spatially stable thing 
that does not change in time. The schema of a substance directs 
the concept of substance to a substance, since it exhibits spatial 
and temporal structure based on which it determines an 
experience of x as a substance if x has spatially stable structure 
that does not change in time. The matching consists in the 
overlap of the same spatial and temporal structure of the 
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experience and the schema—in the case of substance: spatially 
stable form that does not change in time. 
The same considerations apply to empirical concepts 
too—not only to the concepts of substance, cause, reality, and so 
forth—Kant’s pure concepts of the understanding. The concept 
of dog is governed by a schema that determines all possible 
spatiotemporal forms that dogs can exhibit. 
The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my 
imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, 
without being restricted to any single particular shape that 
experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in 
concreto. (Kant 1998, B181, 182 / A 142) 
At the same time, all the possible ways in which one can 
experience dogs exhibit a particular spatiotemporal form, i.e. 
dog-form. Accordingly, my concept of dog is about dogs, and can 
only be about dogs in the first place, because it is connected 
through the schema of dog to dogs in the world, since both 
exhibit matching spatiotemporal form—the particular 
instantiation of the dog schematas1-t1-particular dog with dog 
forms1-t1. For instance, the declarative sentence, ‘there is a dog 
on the mat’, is about a dog in the world because it is governed 
by schemata that determine the spatiotemporal forms according 
to which dogs can appear on mats and it can match an actual 
appearance of a dog on a mat in space and time.  
Importantly, what is required for experience and 
conceptual thought to interact is that both are at the basic level 
characterized by spatial and temporal attributes. Experience is 
basically characterized by the invariant structures spatiality 
and temporality; in Kant’s case, the pure forms of intuition 
space and time. Concepts are basically characterized by the 
invariant structures spatiality and temporality; in Kant’s case, 
through spatiotemporal schemata. Since both experience and 
conceptual thought exhibit the same basic structure, spatiality 
and temporality, they can interact and be synthesized. 
Kant is quite clear about what is entailed for conceptual 
understanding if we accept that it is governed by schemata. 
Concepts cannot constitute an arbitrary, autonomous kind of 
understanding, but schemata determine the scope, application 
and meaning of concepts.  
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Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true 
and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects 
[Beziehung auf Objekte], thus with significance [Bedeutung] (…). 
(Kant 1998, A145-146 / B185, emphasis and translation in original) 
This is the case, since not only the aboutness 
relationship between conceptual thought and objects is 
determined by schemata, but also because that what concepts 
can mean is completely determined by the possible ways in 
which an object can appear to me in space and time.  
As we can see from this, Kant’s own approach is quite 
different from John McDowell’s Kant-inspired account 
(McDowell 1994, 2007), according to which concepts reach into 
experience, without further mediation by schemata; where 
neither conceptual thought is constrained by schemata, nor 
experience is primarily characterized by spatiality and 
temporality. 
McDowell breaks with Kant in that he does not provide 
an analysis of the relationship between experience and 
conceptual thought by means of a mediating structure, i.e. 
schemata. Rather, he claims that our experience is readily 
available for conceptual understanding without providing an 
account of the mediating structure that could make experience 
available for conceptual understanding; i.e. without an 
explanation of the conditions that make it possible that 
experience and conceptual thought can interact. As McDowell 
claims: 
We can equip ourselves with new conceptual capacities, in that sense, 
by isolating and focusing on—annexing bits of language to—other 
aspects of the categorially unified content of the experience, aspects 
that were hitherto not within the scope of our capacities for explicit 
thought. (McDowell 2007, 347, emphasis added) 
For McDowell, conceptual thought is simply linguistic 
and it can reach into experience qua its linguistic structure, 
which presupposes that the structure of experience exhibits 
linguistic structure too. 
Yet, as I have shown above, at least for Kant, what 
provides experience with “categorically unified content” or the 
Kantian equivalent thereof, is that experience is structured by 
the pure forms of intuition space and time, i.e. that experience 
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is itself structured into objects that have a particular 
spatiotemporal form that differentiates them from other objects 
and makes them available to be the object about which a 
schema, and thereby a concept, can be.  
Since McDowell does not account for such a mediating 
structure, he not only fails to provide an analysis of the 
conditions that make the application of concepts to experience 
possible. He also renders the relationship between experience 
as well as embodied understanding and conceptual thought 
intellectualist, since he argues that experience and embodied 
understanding exhibit conceptual structure. 
 
3.2. Schemata as a bridging structure 
Importantly, we do not have to accept the particular 
ontological ramifications of Kantian philosophy in order to see 
in schemata an attractive option for the explanation of at least 
a minimal interaction between embodied understanding and 
conceptual-representational understanding. In the following I 
will spell out why schemata can be considered to be an 
ontologically and cognitively non-demanding structure. Then I 
will show, that, given the ontologically and cognitively non-
demanding structure of schemata, we can conceive of embodied 
understanding as minimally characterized by schematic 
structure, which gives us the ground for an interaction between 
the kinds of understanding. Finally, I will spell out different 
ways of how we can conceive of the schematic relationship 
between embodied understanding and conceptual-
representational understanding—ranging from the strong 
Kantian (and Phenomenological) project, to a minimalist 
interaction between both kinds of understanding that explains 
how we can, for instance, make verbal reports about the objects 
of embodied understanding. 
Many readers might be skeptical about accepting a 
Kantian conception of schemata, because they might worry that 
such a strategy commits them to an acceptance of wider aspects 
of the Kantian project that they might find not desirable. Yet, 
we do not have to accept other aspects of Kant’s system to adopt 
his conception of schemata; for instance, his claim that space 
and time are pure forms of intuition or that there are pure 
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concepts of the understanding, i.e. basic categories such as 
substance or causality.  
Indeed, the idea of a schema is ontologically modest, 
since it is formulated about primitive, invariant spatiotemporal 
properties of objects that characterize these objects in a 
minimal and essential fashion. There is nothing ontologically 
obscure about claiming that the objects of our thoughts, such as 
dogs, have a particular spatiotemporal form and have it 
essentially. There is further nothing cognitively obscure or 
demanding about the claim that understanding has to be 
responsive to the temporal and spatial aspects of the world; for 
instance, by exhibiting temporal structure itself. Quite to the 
opposite, it seems difficult to make sense of the responsiveness 
to a spatial world in temporal change without such a conception 
of schemata—for instance, based on an explanation formulated 
over disembodied, symbolic representations. 
Since there is neither anything cognitively nor 
ontologically demanding about schemata, we can conceive of 
embodied understanding as schematic too—which is obviously a 
necessary condition for the interaction of the kinds of 
understanding through schemata. 
I do not purport that I can present an exhaustive 
argument for the claim that embodied understanding is 
governed by schematic structure. I merely want to show here 
that it is a plausible option to conceive of embodied 
understanding as itself spatiotemporally schematic. 
If I bring my embodied understanding to bear on an 
action, for instance, the action of making coffee, I need to have 
a practical understanding of the behaviors and objects involved 
in the action. This embodied understanding is itself 
characterized by an aboutness relation, as in particular 
Merleau-Ponty (2012) has argued, that is neither cognitive nor 
merely causal, i.e. a motor intentional aboutness relationship 
(Carman 1999; Kelly 2002). 
This intentional relationship is characterized by an 
interaction of motor abilities (e.g. embodied abilities) of an 
agent and spatiotemporal objects. As is well known, Merleau-
Ponty conceives of the spatiotemporal nature of objects as 
determined though a body schematic relationship. As Merleau-
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Ponty (2012, 103) states, “each figure appears perspectivally 
against the double horizon of external space and bodily space.” 
Independent of how we conceive of this (body) schematic 
structure exactly, whether it is determined through 
embodiment (Merleau-Ponty) or without embodiment (Kant), it 
is essentially of a spatiotemporal nature, as the following 
example illustrates. 
Take for instance the action of coffee making—a simple, 
cognitively non-demanding action governed by embodied 
understanding. In order to make coffee, I need to understand, 
non-deliberatively and non-thematically, among many other 
things, what a coffee machine does and I need to understand 
how to behave towards it, i.e. I have to understand non-
conceptually which buttons I have to press, where I have to 
insert the coffee, when I have to stop inserting it and so forth.  
This means, my understanding of which action I have to 
perform is relative to my understanding of which objects are 
involved in the action (coffee machine, coffee ground, kitchen 
cabinet, etc.). And my understanding has to be about these 
objects—in order to identify a coffee machine as a coffee 
machine, i.e. as something that in this situation produces coffee 
for me. What allows for the application of my embodied 
understanding to objects is schematic structure.  
The most basic, invariant features of a coffee machine 
are its spatiotemporal properties. I do not have to be aware of 
them as such, yet they nevertheless allow me to see a particular 
physical configuration in space and time as a coffee machine. 
My understanding of the coffee machine itself is not primarily 
spatiotemporal. It is about what I can do with the coffee 
machine and how it can fulfill my concerns. But a 
spatiotemporal schema allows me to pick out an otherwise 
insignificant object out of space and time as a thing of which I 
have a particular concern-fulfilling and action-oriented 
understanding. 
Similarly, the structure of my behavior is guided by a 
spatiotemporal schema in relation to objects. As Stanley and 
Krakauer (2013) and Stanley and Williamson (2016) have 
pointed out, action is governed by an understanding of 
initiation conditions. This means, I need to understand, in 
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relation to an environmental situation, when I have to initiate 
or change my course of behavior in order to produce a result I 
have concern for. For instance, if I open the lid of my coffee 
machine I need to understand when to start pouring ground 
coffee into the filter of the machine and when to stop. 
Krakauer, Stanley and Williamson argue that this 
understanding of initiation conditions is housed in mental 
representations that correspond to facts. Yet, we can equally 
conceive of this understanding as governed by spatiotemporal 
schemata. The schema cannot only specify which objects are 
involved in an action, but it has further an intimate connection 
to temporality itself, which is necessary to determine stop and 
initiation conditions of an action. 
Now that we see that we can conceive of embodied 
understanding as spatiotemporally schematic too, we can 
analyze the possible relationships that can hold between 
embodied understanding and conceptual-representational 
understanding, based on their schematic structure. 
 
4. Different interactions: ways to connect both kinds 
of understanding 
In the following I discuss two different ways we can 
conceive of the schematic relationship between embodied 
understanding and conceptual-representational understanding. 
First, a tight relationship, that grounds conceptual-
representational understanding in embodied understanding 
through schemata. Second, a loose relationship, that grants 
autonomy to both kinds of understanding, yet, lets them 
interact at various levels through schemata. I cannot spell out 
the specifics of such a relationship in this paper. Rather, I 
merely describe which kinds of relationship can in principle 
follow from the structural connection between the two kinds of 
understanding that is grounded in schematic structure. The 
details of such a relationship will have to await further, more 
detailed deliberations.  
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4.1. Grounding conceptual-representational understanding in 
embodied understanding 
We can conceive of the relationship between embodied 
and conceptual-representational understanding, as Kant 
conceived of the relationship between experience and 
conceptual thought. In that case, embodied understanding, as 
that which contributes to our structure of experience or is at 
least closely connected to it (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; 
Thompson 2007), is that which governs conceptual-
representational understanding insofar as it bestows meaning 
and significance to it. Accordingly, we can conceive of the 
relationship between the two kinds of understanding as a 
grounding relationship.  
Conceiving of the relationship as a close one could be 
interesting for any author that follows Heidegger (1962) in 
arguing that the meaning of thought or linguistic expressions 
requires a grounding in our practical understanding of the 
world, that itself is grounded in concern or sensorimotor skill. 
For instance, my concept of a coffee machine receives 
significance through the significance that coffee machines have 
for me based on the ways I can relate to them based on my 
embodied understanding of them. This grounding relation 
allows then that concepts have pragmatic meaning.  
 
 
4.2. Preserving autonomy through minimal interaction 
If we want to grant conceptual-representational 
understanding a high degree of autonomy and argue for a 
marked difference between the modes of engagement realized 
by embodied and conceptual-representational understanding 
respectively (Wheeler 2005; Dreyfus 2007a), we can obviously 
also conceive of the relationship between both kinds of 
understanding in a weaker form; yet still schematically 
mediated. 
If both, embodied understanding and conceptual-
representational understanding are exhibiting schematic 
structure, both kinds of understanding can be elicited or 
exerted in the same situation. If I make coffee, my 
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spatiotemporally schematic understanding of the situation not 
only allows me to bring my embodied understanding to bear on 
the situation, but through a similar or the same schema, my 
concept of, say, “coffee machine” can be elicited too. This allows 
then to make verbal reports about the situation at hand and it 
allows to form conceptual judgments such as “I am making 
coffee”—an action that is otherwise governed by embodied 
understanding.5 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that spatiotemporal schemata are the 
condition that make it possible that embodied understanding 
and conceptual-representational understanding can interact. I 
have shown that the separation that is made between both 
kinds of understanding by contemporary Phenomenologists 
(Dreyfus 2007a, b) and proponents of Embodied Cognition 
(Wheeler 2005, 2008; Chemero 2009) renders the interaction 
between them puzzling. Concretely, I have argued, in accord 
with McDowell (1994, 2007), Dreyfus (2007a) and Noë (2004, 
2012), that the separation between these kinds of 
understanding cannot account for how we can produce reports 
about our actions that are governed by embodied 
understanding, or how we can make judgments about them. 
Further, I have argued that the separation can further not 
account for the seeming interaction between both kinds of 
understanding in everyday action and, at least from a 
phenomenological point of view, for how conceptual-
representational understanding receives meaning and 
significance through embodied understanding. These problems 
make it necessary to account for the interaction between both 
kinds of understanding. 
I have then argued that spatiotemporal schemata are 
well-suited to account for this interaction. I have advanced a 
conception of schemata that is based on Kant’s own conception 
of schemata. I have argued that schemata are basic, 
ontologically and cognitively modest structures that relate to 
spatial and temporal properties of objects. I then suggested that 
schemata underlie both, embodied as well as conceptual-
representational understanding. If that is the case, both, 
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embodied and conceptual-representational understanding have 
the same basic structure in common that allows for their 
interaction.  
Finally, I have spelled out two different ways in which 
the two kinds of understanding could interact through 
schemata. I have described a close interaction relationship, in 
which conceptual-representational understanding is grounded 
in embodied understanding—an idea valuable for 
Phenomenologists and philosophers who conceive of embodied 
understanding as the primary locus of meaning and 
significance. I have further depicted another way to conceive of 
the relationship as a looser one in which both kinds of 
understanding minimally interact—so that we are able to make 
reports about our actions or to transform our thoughts into 
actions—yet, where embodied understanding and conceptual-
representational understanding are in many ways autonomous 
from each other and preserve their unique properties and 
functions. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1The exception to the rule is Alva Noë (2004, 2012) who has rejected the 
separation as intellectualist.  
2Accounts by McDowell (1994, 2007) and Noë (2004, 2012) are the exceptions 
to this explanatory shortcoming. I discuss McDowell briefly in § 3.1. A 
discussion of Noë unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
3Dreyfus understandably has to make this claim, given his own theoretical 
presuppositions, to thwart John McDowell’s (1994, 2007) claim that 
experience exhibits conceptuality. However, Dreyfus’s claim entails 
unfortunately a contradiction to his own claims about the continuity between 
embodied and conceptual-representational understanding. ‘To focus on the 
motor intentional content, then, is not to make some implicit conceptual 
content explicit—that’s the myth—but rather to transform the motor 
intentional content into conceptual content, thereby making it available for 
rational analysis but no longer capable of directly motivating action’ (Dreyfus 
2007a, 360). Worse, Dreyfus’s statement, cited in the main text, clearly cuts 
off embodied understanding from conceptual-representational understanding. 
4Importantly, Heidegger, who inspires Dreyfus and Wheeler to sharply 
separate between both kinds of understanding, does not make the same 
separation for two reasons. First, Heidegger does not differentiate between 
embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding, or 
rather, between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, the way Dreyfus 
and Wheeler do. Heidegger nowhere claims that we are experiencing ‘context-
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free, self-sufficient substances with detachable properties—McDowell’s world 
of facts, features, and data’ when we engage with the world as present-at-
hand, as Dreyfus (2007a, 364) suggests. Rather, he makes clear that presence-
at-hand is grounded in readiness-to-hand. As he states, “readiness-to-hand is 
the way in which entities as they are ‘in themselves’ are defined ontologico-
categorically” (Heidegger 1962, 101). Further, “when we merely stare at 
something (presence-at-hand), our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a 
failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the “as”, is a 
privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands (readiness-to-
hand). It (presence-at-hand) is not more primordial than that kind of seeing 
(readiness-to-hand), but is derived from it” (Heidegger 1962, 190, brackets 
added). And Heidegger makes elsewhere plainly clear that presence-at-hand 
is this deprived form of merely looking at things. The clearest expression of 
this might be, ‘theoretical behavior is just looking, without circumspection’ 
(Heidegger 1962, 99, emphasis added). This means, presence-at-hand is a 
‘deficient mode of concern’ (Heidegger 1962, 103)—in which something that 
was formerly ready-to-hand is only just present (‘Nur-noch-vorhandensein 
eines Zuhandenen’) (Heidegger 2006, 73). Here we can also see the second 
reason, why Heidegger would reject Dreyfus’s and Wheeler’s separation 
between both kinds of understanding. For Heidegger, the difference between 
readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand is not a division between 
conceptuality or representational thought on the one hand and sensorimotor 
or embodied understanding on the other hand. Heidegger nowhere claims that 
conceptual or representational understanding governs presence-at-hand. As 
we have seen above, Heidegger uses perceptual and agential vocabulary to 
describe how we encounter the world as present-at-hand. This makes further 
sense, if we consider the role of language in Heidegger’s care structure in the 
form of discourse. The care structure, Heidegger’s most basic ontological 
structure after temporality (Heidegger 1962, 329), is co-constituted by 
understanding, state-of-mind (affect), falling, and discourse (Heidegger 1962, 
384-385). Understanding is characterized by its disclosing ability, which 
presents an object or a situation, together with affect, as mattering to an 
agent by showing up for which purpose something can be used (Heidegger 
1962, 182). Discourse, which is the condition for speaking a language, is not 
conceived of as detached theoretical linguistic thinking, but as an existential 
structure that contributes to the structure of understanding and allows for its 
articulation (Heidegger 1962, 203-204). Discourse, as part of the care 
structure, is characteristic of both, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. 
Yet, in both cases it is a co-constitutive part of the care structure, but never a 
self-standing intellectualist device for judgment and representation, as both 
Dreyfus and Wheeler suggest. 
5To explain the relationship between both kinds of understanding in terms of 
schemata has further explanatory advantages, even if we should only accept a 
loose relationship. For instance, if conceptual thought is governed by 
spatiotemporal schemata, we might be able to account for the grounding of 
demonstratives and the identification of spatiotemporal objects in perceptual 
judgments. Both these properties of thought relate to spatial and temporal 
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properties of objects and schemata are structures that explain how we can 
relate to objects in space and time.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Carman, T. 1999. ‘The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’. 
Philosophical Topics 27(2): 205–226. 
Chemero, A. 2009. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. 
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Chemero, A. 2014. ‘Synergies and Systematicity’. In The 
Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's 
Systematicity Challenge, edited by P. Calvo and J. Symons, 
353–370. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Clark, A. and J. Toribio. 1994. ‘Doing without Representing?’ 
Synthese 101(3): 401–31. 
Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on 
Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge (MA): MIT 
Press. 
Dreyfus, H. 2007a. ‘The Return of the Myth of the Mental’. 
Inquiry 50(4): 352–365. 
Dreyfus, H. 2007b. ‘Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how 
Fixing it would Require Making it more Heideggerian’. 
Philosophical Psychology  20(2): 247–268. 
Dreyfus, H. 2013. ‘The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the 
Mental’. In Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The 
McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by J. K. Schear, 15–40. 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
Dreyfus, H. and C. Taylor. 2015. Retrieving Realism. 
Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 
Gallagher, S. 2014. ‘Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and 
Extended Conceptions of Cognition’. Philosophical Issues 24(1): 
110–126. 
Hanna, R. 2005. ‘Kant and Nonconceptual Content’. European 
Journal of Philosophy 13(2): 247–290. 
 
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 
652 
 
 
Heidegger, M. 1962. Being and Time, translated and edited by 
J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson New York: Harper Collins. 
Heidegger, M.  1990. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
translated by R. Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Heidegger, M. 2006. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag. 
Hurley, S.  1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press. 
Hutto, D.  2012. ‘Exposing the Background: Deep and Local’. 
InKnowing without Thinking: Mind, Action, Cognition and the 
Phenomenon of the Background, edited by Z. Radman, 37–56. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hutto, D. and E. Myin  2013. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic 
Minds without Content. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Kant, I.  1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited 
by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kelly, S.  2002. ‘Merleau-Ponty on the Body’. Ratio 15(4): 376–
391. 
Kiverstein, J. and E. Rietveld  2015. ‘The Primacy of Skilled 
Intentionality: On Hutto & Satne’s the Natural Origins of 
Content’. Philosophia 43(3): 701–721. 
van Mazijk, C.  2016. ‘Kant and Husserl on the Contents of 
Perception’. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54(2): 267–
287. 
McDowell, J.  1994. Mind and World. Cambridge (MA): 
Harvard University Press. 
McDowell, J.  2007. ‘What Myth?’ Inquiry 50(4): 338–351. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. 2012. Phenomenology of Perception. 
Translated and edited by D. Landes. Abingdon: Routledge. 
Noë, A.  2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge (MA): MIT 
Press. 
Noë, A. 2012. Varieties of Presence. Cambridge (MA): Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 
 
 
653 
 
 
O'Regan, K. and A. Noë  2001. ‘A Sensorimotor Account of 
Vision and Visual Consciousness’. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 24(5): 939–973. 
Ratcliffe, M.  2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, 
Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sherover, C.  1971. Heidegger, Kant and Time. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press. 
Stanley, J. and J. Krakauer  2013. ‘Motor Skill Depends on 
Knowledge of Facts’. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7. 
Stanley, J. and T. Williamson. 2016. ‘Skill’. Nous 
DOI:10.1111(nous.12144. [Online first publication]. 
Thompson, E.  2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and 
the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University 
Press. 
Thompson, E. and M. Stapleton  2009. ‘Making Sense of Sense-
Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories’. 
Topoi 28(1): 23–30. 
Wheeler, M.  2005. Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The 
Next Step. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. 
Wheeler, M.  2008. ‘Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, 
Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem’, International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(3): 323–349. 
 
 
Alexander A. Jeuk: Ph.D., defended in February 2017, graduation in May 
2017 at the University of Cincinnati. His research interests comprise 
Phenomenology, Kantianism, Enactivism and Embodied Cognition. 
 
 
Address: 
Alexander A. Jeuk 
University of Cincinnati 
Department of Philosophy 
PO BOX 210374 
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374 
Email: alexander.jeuk@googlemail.com 
